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-rw-r--r--security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-073498
-rw-r--r--security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-073533
-rw-r--r--security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config19
-rw-r--r--security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in4
4 files changed, 0 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734
deleted file mode 100644
index b2e8ad5c87bd..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734).
-
-Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that
-triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs
-prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack.
-
-Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from #7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c)
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f
---- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c.orig 2018-09-11 12:48:21 UTC
-+++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-+#include "internal/bn_int.h"
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/sha.h>
- #include "dsa_locl.h"
-@@ -178,9 +179,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
- {
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
-- BIGNUM *l, *m;
-+ BIGNUM *l;
- int ret = 0;
-- int q_bits;
-+ int q_bits, q_words;
-
- if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-@@ -189,8 +190,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
-
- k = BN_new();
- l = BN_new();
-- m = BN_new();
-- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL)
-+ if (k == NULL || l == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (ctx_in == NULL) {
-@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
-
- /* Preallocate space */
- q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
-- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits)
-- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits)
-- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits))
-+ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
-+ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
-+ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
- goto err;
-
- /* Get random k */
-@@ -238,14 +238,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
- * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is
- * one bit longer than the modulus.
- *
-- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
-- * conditional copy.
-+ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More
-+ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with:
-+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
-+ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
- */
- if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
-- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q)
-- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m))
-+ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
- goto err;
-
-+ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
-+
- if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
- if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
- dsa->method_mont_p))
-@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
- if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
- goto err;
-
-- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
-+ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
- if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
-@@ -273,7 +276,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(k);
- BN_clear_free(l);
-- BN_clear_free(m);
- return ret;
- }
-
diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735
deleted file mode 100644
index 8166b91cfda1..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735)
-
-Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
-that can potentially provide a side channel.
-
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-(Merged from #7486)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 99540ec)
-
-https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20181029.txt
---- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c.orig 2018-08-14 12:45:07 UTC
-+++ crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
-@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GRO
- */
- cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
- group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
-- if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL)
-- || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL))
-+ if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
-+ || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (!BN_copy(k, scalar))
-@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GRO
- * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
- */
- kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
-- BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1);
-+ BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
-
- group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
- if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config
deleted file mode 100644
index f68b1c587b8e..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
---- config.orig 2016-02-15 18:08:07 UTC
-+++ config
-@@ -713,14 +713,8 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
- sparc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;;
- ia64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-ia64" ;;
- amd64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;;
-- *86*-*-*bsd*) # mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc...
-- if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then # [Free|Net]BSD
-- libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
-- else # OpenBSD
-- # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
-- libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
-- fi
-- case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
-+ *86*-*-*bsd*)
-+ case "`(file -L /bin/sh) 2>/dev/null`" in
- *ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;
- *) OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;;
- esac ;;
diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in b/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in
deleted file mode 100644
index f2dbef6b33f9..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-
-Copy %%PREFIX%%/openssl/openssl.cnf.sample to %%PREFIX%%/openssl/openssl.cnf
-and edit it to fit your needs.
-
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-11-23 13:39:42 +0000