diff options
| author | Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> | 2018-11-04 08:59:18 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> | 2018-11-04 08:59:18 +0000 |
| commit | efd6dfdadf1148d819fcee0bd3d35d8209ca80f5 (patch) | |
| tree | 30d694d7382b888829b98e67b20025cccd8fbd14 /security/openssl-devel/files | |
| parent | New port: science/liggghts: Discrete element method particle simulation software (diff) | |
security/openssl-devel: Remove port
- OpenSSL 1.1.1 is ABI compatible
- Aligns with FreeBSD 12
Reviewed by: bapt, rene
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17136
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl-devel/files')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 | 98 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in | 4 |
4 files changed, 0 insertions, 154 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 deleted file mode 100644 index b2e8ad5c87bd..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0734 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734). - -Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that -triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs -prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. - -Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. - -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -(Merged from #7486) - -(cherry picked from commit a9cfb8c) - -https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/8abfe72e8c1de1b95f50aa0d9134803b4d00070f ---- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c.orig 2018-09-11 12:48:21 UTC -+++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ - - #include <stdio.h> - #include "internal/cryptlib.h" -+#include "internal/bn_int.h" - #include <openssl/bn.h> - #include <openssl/sha.h> - #include "dsa_locl.h" -@@ -178,9 +179,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - { - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp; -- BIGNUM *l, *m; -+ BIGNUM *l; - int ret = 0; -- int q_bits; -+ int q_bits, q_words; - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); -@@ -189,8 +190,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - - k = BN_new(); - l = BN_new(); -- m = BN_new(); -- if (k == NULL || l == NULL || m == NULL) -+ if (k == NULL || l == NULL) - goto err; - - if (ctx_in == NULL) { -@@ -201,9 +201,9 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - - /* Preallocate space */ - q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q); -- if (!BN_set_bit(k, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(l, q_bits) -- || !BN_set_bit(m, q_bits)) -+ q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q); -+ if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2) -+ || !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2)) - goto err; - - /* Get random k */ -@@ -238,14 +238,17 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - * small timing information leakage. We then choose the sum that is - * one bit longer than the modulus. - * -- * TODO: revisit the BN_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic -- * conditional copy. -+ * There are some concerns about the efficacy of doing this. More -+ * specificly refer to the discussion starting with: -+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705 -+ * The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required. - */ - if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q) -- || !BN_add(m, l, dsa->q) -- || !BN_copy(k, BN_num_bits(l) > q_bits ? l : m)) -+ || !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q)) - goto err; - -+ BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2); -+ - if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) { - if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, - dsa->method_mont_p)) -@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) - goto err; - -- /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ -+ /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ - if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) - goto err; - -@@ -273,7 +276,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_clear_free(k); - BN_clear_free(l); -- BN_clear_free(m); - return ret; - } - diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 deleted file mode 100644 index 8166b91cfda1..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-CVE-2018-0735 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735) - -Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation -that can potentially provide a side channel. - -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -(Merged from #7486) - -(cherry picked from commit 99540ec) - -https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20181029.txt ---- crypto/ec/ec_mult.c.orig 2018-08-14 12:45:07 UTC -+++ crypto/ec/ec_mult.c -@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GRO - */ - cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); - group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); -- if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL) -- || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) -+ if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL) -+ || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) - goto err; - - if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) -@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int ec_mul_consttime(const EC_GRO - * k := scalar + 2*cardinality - */ - kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); -- BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1); -+ BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2); - - group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); - if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL) diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config b/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config deleted file mode 100644 index f68b1c587b8e..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl-devel/files/patch-config +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ ---- config.orig 2016-02-15 18:08:07 UTC -+++ config -@@ -713,14 +713,8 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in - sparc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;; - ia64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-ia64" ;; - amd64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;; -- *86*-*-*bsd*) # mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc... -- if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then # [Free|Net]BSD -- libc=/usr/lib/libc.so -- else # OpenBSD -- # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we -- libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null` -- fi -- case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in -+ *86*-*-*bsd*) -+ case "`(file -L /bin/sh) 2>/dev/null`" in - *ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;; - *) OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;; - esac ;; diff --git a/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in b/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in deleted file mode 100644 index f2dbef6b33f9..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl-devel/files/pkg-message.in +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - -Copy %%PREFIX%%/openssl/openssl.cnf.sample to %%PREFIX%%/openssl/openssl.cnf -and edit it to fit your needs. - |
