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--- docs/README.logcheck-database.orig	2017-01-25 21:08:04 UTC
+++ docs/README.logcheck-database
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ normal egrep pattern-matches, applied in
 1. the "SECURITY ALERTS" layer, designed to detect the traces of active
 	intrusion attempts.
 
-   Patterns raising the alarm go in "/etc/logcheck/cracking.d"; any
+   Patterns raising the alarm go in "%%ETCDIR%%/cracking.d"; any
 	event that matches one of these patterns turns the report
 	into an urgent "Security Alerts" report, with the relevant
 	event moved to a special section.  The cracking.d standard
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ normal egrep pattern-matches, applied in
 	the default logcheck configuration, but if the local
 	administrator enables this layer of filtering in
 	logcheck.conf, then the rules go in the directory
-	"/etc/logcheck/cracking.ignore.d".  Matches with
+	"%%ETCDIR%%/cracking.ignore.d".  Matches with
 	cracking.ignore rules will then reclassify the alert as a
 	false alarm (compare violations.ignore below).  Note that
 	this means they are totally ignored - log messages handled
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ normal egrep pattern-matches, applied in
 2. the "SECURITY EVENTS" layer, designed to detect less critical
 	events still considered worthy of special attention.
 
-   Patterns raising the alarm go in "/etc/logcheck/violations.d";
+   Patterns raising the alarm go in "%%ETCDIR%%/violations.d";
 	matches with these result in a "Security Events" alert,
 	with the relevant event moved to a special section.
 
    Patterns cancelling such alarms go in the standard directory
-	"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d"; apparent "Security
+	"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.ignore.d"; apparent "Security
 	Events" that match with violations.ignore patterns are
 	discarded as false alarms.
 
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ normal egrep pattern-matches, applied in
 	from the logfiles are considered for inclusion in the main
 	"System Events" section.
 
-   Patterns in the three "/etc/logcheck/ignore.d.*" directories
+   Patterns in the three "%%ETCDIR%%/ignore.d.*" directories
 	again function to overrule alerts; the log messages that
 	match them are excluded from the report as trivial.  The
 	specific directories consulted depend on the prevailing
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ underscore, and hyphen.
 Contains filters relevant to only one Debian package - for example
 if "fooserver" logs suspicious events like this:
 "$DATE $HOSTNAME fooserver[$PID]: $USER is up to no good"
-then a line in "/etc/logcheck/violations.d/fooserver" with an
+then a line in "%%ETCDIR%%/violations.d/fooserver" with an
 appropriate pattern will promote it from a mere "System Event"
 to a full "Security Event" in a subsection of the mailing headed
 "fooserver".  Or then again if that kind of log message is more
 trivial than it looks (maybe "foo" is a networked game of
 spy-and-counterspy) then a line in
-"/etc/logcheck/ignore.d.server/fooserver" will turn it into a
+"%%ETCDIR%%/ignore.d.server/fooserver" will turn it into a
 nonevent for all but the most assiduous of administrators.
 
 Sometimes a package will have not only special alarm calls which
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ that need to be processed.
 
 Standard "generic" rules go in each directory's "./logcheck" file;
 thus for instance any log message at all matching "ATTACK"
-(listed in "/etc/logcheck/cracking.d/logcheck") _always_ triggers
+(listed in "%%ETCDIR%%/cracking.d/logcheck") _always_ triggers
 a "Security Alert", unless you deliberately tamper with
 "cracking.ignore.d" rules.
 
@@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ non-package-specific "flagging" patterns
 "fooserver" outputs syslog messages like this:
     "$DATE $HOSTNAME fooserver[$PID]: 3 attempts 0 rejected"
 then the standard keyword "reject" listed in the generic
-"/etc/logcheck/violations.d/logcheck" file will trigger frequent
+"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.d/logcheck" file will trigger frequent
 "Security Events" reports.  Putting a filtering pattern in
-"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/fooserver" won't help here!
+"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.ignore.d/fooserver" won't help here!
 The solution is to use a file named in the specially-privileged
 ./logcheck-<packagename> format:
-"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/logcheck-fooserver".
+"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.ignore.d/logcheck-fooserver".
 This can contain patterns provided by that particular package
 which nonetheless need to take precedence over the generic rules.
 
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ Sysadmins can use the "local-*" filename
 additions to the "logcheck-*" pattern lists.  If you have "ippl"
 logging network connections verbosely into syslog then you can put
 custom "Security Events" keywords in
-"/etc/logcheck/violations.d/local-ippl" and exceptions in
-"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/local-ippl".
+"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.d/local-ippl" and exceptions in
+"%%ETCDIR%%/violations.ignore.d/local-ippl".
 
 
 WRITING RULES
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ logcheck-test(1)).
 Alternatively you can manually grep your log file, and remove trailing
 space with something like this:
 
-    sed -e 's/[[:space:]]*$//' /var/log/syslog | egrep \
+    sed -e 's/[[:space:]]*$//' /var/log/messages | egrep \
     '^\w{3} [ :0-9]{11} oempc wwwoffled\[[0-9]+\]: WWWOFFLE (On|Off)line\.$'
 
 If the log line is displayed, then your regex works.