diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl31-quictls/files')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl31-quictls/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl31-quictls/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 | 198 |
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 218 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl31-quictls/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits b/security/openssl31-quictls/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits deleted file mode 100644 index 947f7447a445..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl31-quictls/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ ---- util/find-doc-nits.orig 2023-08-03 13:45:48 UTC -+++ util/find-doc-nits -@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ my $temp = '/tmp/docnits.txt'; - my $OUT; - my $status = 0; - --$opt_m = "man1,man3,man5,man7" unless $opt_m; -+$opt_m = "man1,man5" unless $opt_m; - die "Argument of -m option may contain only man1, man3, man5, and/or man7" - unless $opt_m =~ /^(man[1357][, ]?)*$/; - my @sections = ( split /[, ]/, $opt_m ); -@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ sub check { - next if $target eq ''; # Skip if links within page, or - next if $target =~ /::/; # links to a Perl module, or - next if $target =~ /^https?:/; # is a URL link, or -- next if $target =~ /\([1357]\)$/; # it has a section -+ next if $target =~ /\([15]\)$/; # it has a section - err($id, "Missing man section number (likely, $mansect) in L<$target>") - } - # Check for proper links to commands. diff --git a/security/openssl31-quictls/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 b/security/openssl31-quictls/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 deleted file mode 100644 index f36b97f194f7..000000000000 --- a/security/openssl31-quictls/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ -From fdf6723362ca51bd883295efe206cb5b1cfa5154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> -Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000 -Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse. - -The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field -(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask, -to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms. - -These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular -reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the -polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as -its final element). - -Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that -precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial -could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr(). - -The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the -standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62). -See the "Finite Field Identification" section of: - - https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html - -The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial -basis X9.62 forms. - -This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when -the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd). - -Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not -enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value. -The return value is now always the number of elements (including the -final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently -large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has -just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space -for non-sentinel values. - -Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose -degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against -CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs. - -The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These -generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1) -disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this -constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit -parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent -problem values as noted above. - -Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623. - -A closely related issue was earlier reported in -<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>. - -Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143 - -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639) - -(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2) ---- - crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------- - test/ec_internal_test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -index c811ae82d6b15..bcc66613cc14d 100644 ---- crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c.orig -+++ crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "bn_local.h" - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+# include <openssl/ec.h> - - /* - * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should -@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - /* - * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i * - * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero -- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array -- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would -- * be filled if array was large enough. -+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with -+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be -+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd. -+ * -+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements -+ * of the array will be filled. -+ * -+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if -+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a` -+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement. -+ * -+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds -+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks, - */ - int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - { - int i, j, k = 0; - BN_ULONG mask; - -- if (BN_is_zero(a)) -+ if (!BN_is_odd(a)) - return 0; - - for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { -@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max) - } - } - -- if (k < max) { -+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (k < max) - p[k] = -1; -- k++; -- } - -- return k; -+ return k + 1; - } - - /* -diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c -index 8c2cd05631696..02cfd4e9d8858 100644 ---- test/ec_internal_test.c.orig -+++ test/ec_internal_test.c -@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void) - } - - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */ -+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void) -+{ -+ int ret = 0; -+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); -+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b; -+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL; -+ -+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n"); -+ -+ BN_CTX_start(ctx); -+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b))) -+ goto out; -+ -+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial"); -+ -+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */ -+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71)) -+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1))) -+ goto out; -+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx))) -+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted", -+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS); -+ -+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL; -+ -+ out: -+ EC_GROUP_free(group1); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group2); -+ EC_GROUP_free(group3); -+ BN_CTX_end(ctx); -+ BN_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */ - static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void) - { -@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void) - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity); - ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple); - #endif - ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len); |