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authorRoger Pau Monné <royger@FreeBSD.org>2015-11-14 09:27:31 +0000
committerRoger Pau Monné <royger@FreeBSD.org>2015-11-14 09:27:31 +0000
commit9da11fae5635a37a9ddffaf4d748819929f75cfc (patch)
tree98cdd042aca2818e51c414d6af54d4b42d4875e5 /sysutils/xen-tools/files
parent- Switch to options helpers (diff)
xen: update to 4.5.2
...and add XSA-156. Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D Reviewed by: bapt Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4150
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=401564
Diffstat (limited to 'sysutils/xen-tools/files')
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa137.patch231
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-1.patch76
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-2.patch28
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-3.patch71
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa139-qemuu-4.5.patch38
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-1.patch82
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-2.patch373
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-3.patch39
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-4.patch53
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-5.patch34
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-6.patch35
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-7.patch32
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa142-4.5.patch53
-rw-r--r--sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa153-libxl.patch86
14 files changed, 0 insertions, 1231 deletions
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa137.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa137.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ffc7fa7d49e3..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa137.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
-From 593fe52faa1b85567a7ec20c69d8cfbc7368ae5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2015 14:50:42 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] xl: Sane handling of extra config file arguments
-
-Various xl sub-commands take additional parameters containing = as
-additional config fragments.
-
-The handling of these config fragments has a number of bugs:
-
- 1. Use of a static 1024-byte buffer. (If truncation would occur,
- with semi-trusted input, a security risk arises due to quotes
- being lost.)
-
- 2. Mishandling of the return value from snprintf, so that if
- truncation occurs, the to-write pointer is updated with the
- wanted-to-write length, resulting in stack corruption. (This is
- XSA-137.)
-
- 3. Clone-and-hack of the code for constructing the appended
- config file.
-
-These are fixed here, by introducing a new function
-`string_realloc_append' and using it everywhere. The `extra_info'
-buffers are replaced by pointers, which start off NULL and are
-explicitly freed on all return paths.
-
-The separate variable which will become dom_info.extra_config is
-abolished (which involves moving the clearing of dom_info).
-
-Additional bugs I observe, not fixed here:
-
- 4. The functions which now call string_realloc_append use ad-hoc
- error returns, with multiple calls to `return'. This currently
- necessitates multiple new calls to `free'.
-
- 5. Many of the paths in xl call exit(-rc) where rc is a libxl status
- code. This is a ridiculous exit status `convention'.
-
- 6. The loops for handling extra config data are clone-and-hacks.
-
- 7. Once the extra config buffer is accumulated, it must be combined
- with the appropriate main config file. The code to do this
- combining is clone-and-hacked too.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Tested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian,campbell@citrix.com>
----
-v2: Use SSIZE_MAX, not INT_MAX.
- Check *accumulate for NULL, not accumulate.
- Move memset of dom_info.
----
- tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
-index c858068..c01a851 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c
-@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct domain_create {
- int console_autoconnect;
- int checkpointed_stream;
- const char *config_file;
-- const char *extra_config; /* extra config string */
-+ char *extra_config; /* extra config string */
- const char *restore_file;
- int migrate_fd; /* -1 means none */
- char **migration_domname_r; /* from malloc */
-@@ -4805,11 +4805,25 @@ int main_vm_list(int argc, char **argv)
- return 0;
- }
-
-+static void string_realloc_append(char **accumulate, const char *more)
-+{
-+ /* Appends more to accumulate. Accumulate is either NULL, or
-+ * points (always) to a malloc'd nul-terminated string. */
-+
-+ size_t oldlen = *accumulate ? strlen(*accumulate) : 0;
-+ size_t morelen = strlen(more) + 1/*nul*/;
-+ if (oldlen > SSIZE_MAX || morelen > SSIZE_MAX - oldlen) {
-+ fprintf(stderr,"Additional config data far too large\n");
-+ exit(-ERROR_FAIL);
-+ }
-+
-+ *accumulate = xrealloc(*accumulate, oldlen + morelen);
-+ memcpy(*accumulate + oldlen, more, morelen);
-+}
-+
- int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- const char *filename = NULL;
-- char *p;
-- char extra_config[1024];
- struct domain_create dom_info;
- int paused = 0, debug = 0, daemonize = 1, console_autoconnect = 0,
- quiet = 0, monitor = 1, vnc = 0, vncautopass = 0;
-@@ -4824,6 +4838,8 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- {0, 0, 0, 0}
- };
-
-+ dom_info.extra_config = NULL;
-+
- if (argv[1] && argv[1][0] != '-' && !strchr(argv[1], '=')) {
- filename = argv[1];
- argc--; argv++;
-@@ -4863,20 +4879,21 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- break;
- }
-
-- extra_config[0] = '\0';
-- for (p = extra_config; optind < argc; optind++) {
-+ memset(&dom_info, 0, sizeof(dom_info));
-+
-+ for (; optind < argc; optind++) {
- if (strchr(argv[optind], '=') != NULL) {
-- p += snprintf(p, sizeof(extra_config) - (p - extra_config),
-- "%s\n", argv[optind]);
-+ string_realloc_append(&dom_info.extra_config, argv[optind]);
-+ string_realloc_append(&dom_info.extra_config, "\n");
- } else if (!filename) {
- filename = argv[optind];
- } else {
- help("create");
-+ free(dom_info.extra_config);
- return 2;
- }
- }
-
-- memset(&dom_info, 0, sizeof(dom_info));
- dom_info.debug = debug;
- dom_info.daemonize = daemonize;
- dom_info.monitor = monitor;
-@@ -4884,16 +4901,18 @@ int main_create(int argc, char **argv)
- dom_info.dryrun = dryrun_only;
- dom_info.quiet = quiet;
- dom_info.config_file = filename;
-- dom_info.extra_config = extra_config;
- dom_info.migrate_fd = -1;
- dom_info.vnc = vnc;
- dom_info.vncautopass = vncautopass;
- dom_info.console_autoconnect = console_autoconnect;
-
- rc = create_domain(&dom_info);
-- if (rc < 0)
-+ if (rc < 0) {
-+ free(dom_info.extra_config);
- return -rc;
-+ }
-
-+ free(dom_info.extra_config);
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -4901,8 +4920,7 @@ int main_config_update(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- uint32_t domid;
- const char *filename = NULL;
-- char *p;
-- char extra_config[1024];
-+ char *extra_config = NULL;
- void *config_data = 0;
- int config_len = 0;
- libxl_domain_config d_config;
-@@ -4940,15 +4958,15 @@ int main_config_update(int argc, char **argv)
- break;
- }
-
-- extra_config[0] = '\0';
-- for (p = extra_config; optind < argc; optind++) {
-+ for (; optind < argc; optind++) {
- if (strchr(argv[optind], '=') != NULL) {
-- p += snprintf(p, sizeof(extra_config) - (p - extra_config),
-- "%s\n", argv[optind]);
-+ string_realloc_append(&extra_config, argv[optind]);
-+ string_realloc_append(&extra_config, "\n");
- } else if (!filename) {
- filename = argv[optind];
- } else {
- help("create");
-+ free(extra_config);
- return 2;
- }
- }
-@@ -4957,7 +4975,8 @@ int main_config_update(int argc, char **argv)
- rc = libxl_read_file_contents(ctx, filename,
- &config_data, &config_len);
- if (rc) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read config file: %s: %s\n",
-- filename, strerror(errno)); return ERROR_FAIL; }
-+ filename, strerror(errno));
-+ free(extra_config); return ERROR_FAIL; }
- if (strlen(extra_config)) {
- if (config_len > INT_MAX - (strlen(extra_config) + 2 + 1)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Failed to attach extra configration\n");
-@@ -4998,7 +5017,7 @@ int main_config_update(int argc, char **argv)
- libxl_domain_config_dispose(&d_config);
-
- free(config_data);
--
-+ free(extra_config);
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -7255,7 +7274,7 @@ int main_cpupoolcreate(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- const char *filename = NULL, *config_src=NULL;
- const char *p;
-- char extra_config[1024];
-+ char *extra_config = NULL;
- int opt;
- static struct option opts[] = {
- {"defconfig", 1, 0, 'f'},
-@@ -7289,13 +7308,10 @@ int main_cpupoolcreate(int argc, char **argv)
- break;
- }
-
-- memset(extra_config, 0, sizeof(extra_config));
- while (optind < argc) {
- if ((p = strchr(argv[optind], '='))) {
-- if (strlen(extra_config) + 1 + strlen(argv[optind]) < sizeof(extra_config)) {
-- strcat(extra_config, "\n");
-- strcat(extra_config, argv[optind]);
-- }
-+ string_realloc_append(&extra_config, "\n");
-+ string_realloc_append(&extra_config, argv[optind]);
- } else if (!filename) {
- filename = argv[optind];
- } else {
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-1.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a41848ddf25..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From a9de14175548c04e0f8be7fae219246509ba46a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 14:13:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] ide: Check array bounds before writing to io_buffer
- (CVE-2015-5154)
-
-If the end_transfer_func of a command is called because enough data has
-been read or written for the current PIO transfer, and it fails to
-correctly call the command completion functions, the DRQ bit in the
-status register and s->end_transfer_func may remain set. This allows the
-guest to access further bytes in s->io_buffer beyond s->data_end, and
-eventually overflowing the io_buffer.
-
-One case where this currently happens is emulation of the ATAPI command
-START STOP UNIT.
-
-This patch fixes the problem by adding explicit array bounds checks
-before accessing the buffer instead of relying on end_transfer_func to
-function correctly.
-
-Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
-Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
----
- hw/ide/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
-index 122e955..44fcc23 100644
---- a/hw/ide/core.c
-+++ b/hw/ide/core.c
-@@ -2021,6 +2021,10 @@ void ide_data_writew(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
- }
-
- p = s->data_ptr;
-+ if (p + 2 > s->data_end) {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- *(uint16_t *)p = le16_to_cpu(val);
- p += 2;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-@@ -2042,6 +2046,10 @@ uint32_t ide_data_readw(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
- }
-
- p = s->data_ptr;
-+ if (p + 2 > s->data_end) {
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- ret = cpu_to_le16(*(uint16_t *)p);
- p += 2;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-@@ -2063,6 +2071,10 @@ void ide_data_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
- }
-
- p = s->data_ptr;
-+ if (p + 4 > s->data_end) {
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
- *(uint32_t *)p = le32_to_cpu(val);
- p += 4;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-@@ -2084,6 +2096,10 @@ uint32_t ide_data_readl(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
- }
-
- p = s->data_ptr;
-+ if (p + 4 > s->data_end) {
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
- ret = cpu_to_le32(*(uint32_t *)p);
- p += 4;
- s->data_ptr = p;
---
-1.8.3.1
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-2.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f860cfa3db6c..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From aa851d30acfbb9580098ac1dc82885530cb8b3c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 14:17:46 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ide/atapi: Fix START STOP UNIT command completion
-
-The command must be completed on all code paths. START STOP UNIT with
-pwrcnd set should succeed without doing anything.
-
-Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
----
- hw/ide/atapi.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/ide/atapi.c b/hw/ide/atapi.c
-index 950e311..79dd167 100644
---- a/hw/ide/atapi.c
-+++ b/hw/ide/atapi.c
-@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ static void cmd_start_stop_unit(IDEState *s, uint8_t* buf)
-
- if (pwrcnd) {
- /* eject/load only happens for power condition == 0 */
-+ ide_atapi_cmd_ok(s);
- return;
- }
-
---
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-3.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ade9b16002f..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa138-qemuu-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-From 1d3c2268f8708126a34064c2e0c1000b40e6f3e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 14:41:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] ide: Clear DRQ after handling all expected accesses
-
-This is additional hardening against an end_transfer_func that fails to
-clear the DRQ status bit. The bit must be unset as soon as the PIO
-transfer has completed, so it's better to do this in a central place
-instead of duplicating the code in all commands (and forgetting it in
-some).
-
-Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
----
- hw/ide/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
-index 44fcc23..50449ca 100644
---- a/hw/ide/core.c
-+++ b/hw/ide/core.c
-@@ -2028,8 +2028,10 @@ void ide_data_writew(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
- *(uint16_t *)p = le16_to_cpu(val);
- p += 2;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-- if (p >= s->data_end)
-+ if (p >= s->data_end) {
-+ s->status &= ~DRQ_STAT;
- s->end_transfer_func(s);
-+ }
- }
-
- uint32_t ide_data_readw(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
-@@ -2053,8 +2055,10 @@ uint32_t ide_data_readw(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
- ret = cpu_to_le16(*(uint16_t *)p);
- p += 2;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-- if (p >= s->data_end)
-+ if (p >= s->data_end) {
-+ s->status &= ~DRQ_STAT;
- s->end_transfer_func(s);
-+ }
- return ret;
- }
-
-@@ -2078,8 +2082,10 @@ void ide_data_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
- *(uint32_t *)p = le32_to_cpu(val);
- p += 4;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-- if (p >= s->data_end)
-+ if (p >= s->data_end) {
-+ s->status &= ~DRQ_STAT;
- s->end_transfer_func(s);
-+ }
- }
-
- uint32_t ide_data_readl(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
-@@ -2103,8 +2109,10 @@ uint32_t ide_data_readl(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
- ret = cpu_to_le32(*(uint32_t *)p);
- p += 4;
- s->data_ptr = p;
-- if (p >= s->data_end)
-+ if (p >= s->data_end) {
-+ s->status &= ~DRQ_STAT;
- s->end_transfer_func(s);
-+ }
- return ret;
- }
-
---
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa139-qemuu-4.5.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa139-qemuu-4.5.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 70ea0661d43a..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa139-qemuu-4.5.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-pci_piix3_xen_ide_unplug should completely unhook the unplugged
-IDEDevice from the corresponding BlockBackend, otherwise the next call
-to release_drive will try to detach the drive again.
-
-Suggested-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
----
- hw/ide/piix.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/ide/piix.c b/hw/ide/piix.c
-index 40757eb..0524dce 100644
---- a/hw/ide/piix.c
-+++ b/hw/ide/piix.c
-@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ int pci_piix3_xen_ide_unplug(DeviceState *dev)
- PCIIDEState *pci_ide;
- DriveInfo *di;
- int i = 0;
-+ IDEDevice *idedev;
-
- pci_ide = PCI_IDE(dev);
-
-@@ -184,6 +185,12 @@ int pci_piix3_xen_ide_unplug(DeviceState *dev)
- }
- bdrv_close(di->bdrv);
- pci_ide->bus[di->bus].ifs[di->unit].bs = NULL;
-+ if (!(i % 2)) {
-+ idedev = pci_ide->bus[di->bus].master;
-+ } else {
-+ idedev = pci_ide->bus[di->bus].slave;
-+ }
-+ idedev->conf.bs = NULL;
- drive_put_ref(di);
- }
- }
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-1.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 043d1893579c..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 5e0c290415b9d57077a86e70c8e6a058868334d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:16:58 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/7] rtl8139: avoid nested ifs in IP header parsing
-
-Transmit offload needs to parse packet headers. If header fields have
-unexpected values the offload processing is skipped.
-
-The code currently uses nested ifs because there is relatively little
-input validation. The next patches will add missing input validation
-and a goto label is more appropriate to avoid deep if statement nesting.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index 5f0197c..91ba33b 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2174,28 +2174,30 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- size_t eth_payload_len = 0;
-
- int proto = be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)(saved_buffer + 12));
-- if (proto == ETH_P_IP)
-+ if (proto != ETH_P_IP)
- {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode has IP packet\n");
--
-- /* not aligned */
-- eth_payload_data = saved_buffer + ETH_HLEN;
-- eth_payload_len = saved_size - ETH_HLEN;
--
-- ip = (ip_header*)eth_payload_data;
--
-- if (IP_HEADER_VERSION(ip) != IP_HEADER_VERSION_4) {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode packet has bad IP version %d "
-- "expected %d\n", IP_HEADER_VERSION(ip),
-- IP_HEADER_VERSION_4);
-- ip = NULL;
-- } else {
-- hlen = IP_HEADER_LENGTH(ip);
-- ip_protocol = ip->ip_p;
-- ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
-- }
-+ goto skip_offload;
- }
-
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode has IP packet\n");
-+
-+ /* not aligned */
-+ eth_payload_data = saved_buffer + ETH_HLEN;
-+ eth_payload_len = saved_size - ETH_HLEN;
-+
-+ ip = (ip_header*)eth_payload_data;
-+
-+ if (IP_HEADER_VERSION(ip) != IP_HEADER_VERSION_4) {
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode packet has bad IP version %d "
-+ "expected %d\n", IP_HEADER_VERSION(ip),
-+ IP_HEADER_VERSION_4);
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+
-+ hlen = IP_HEADER_LENGTH(ip);
-+ ip_protocol = ip->ip_p;
-+ ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
-+
- if (ip)
- {
- if (txdw0 & CP_TX_IPCS)
-@@ -2391,6 +2393,7 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- }
- }
-
-+skip_offload:
- /* update tally counter */
- ++s->tally_counters.TxOk;
-
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-2.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7a76a8a40d25..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,373 +0,0 @@
-From 2d7d80e8dc160904fa7276cc05da26c062a50066 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:16:59 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/7] rtl8139: drop tautologous if (ip) {...} statement
-
-The previous patch stopped using the ip pointer as an indicator that the
-IP header is present. When we reach the if (ip) {...} statement we know
-ip is always non-NULL.
-
-Remove the if statement to reduce nesting.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 305 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
- 1 file changed, 151 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index 91ba33b..2f12d42 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2198,198 +2198,195 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- ip_protocol = ip->ip_p;
- ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
-
-- if (ip)
-+ if (txdw0 & CP_TX_IPCS)
- {
-- if (txdw0 & CP_TX_IPCS)
-- {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode need IP checksum\n");
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode need IP checksum\n");
-
-- if (hlen<sizeof(ip_header) || hlen>eth_payload_len) {/* min header length */
-- /* bad packet header len */
-- /* or packet too short */
-- }
-- else
-- {
-- ip->ip_sum = 0;
-- ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(ip, hlen);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode IP header len=%d checksum=%04x\n",
-- hlen, ip->ip_sum);
-- }
-+ if (hlen<sizeof(ip_header) || hlen>eth_payload_len) {/* min header length */
-+ /* bad packet header len */
-+ /* or packet too short */
- }
--
-- if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_LGSEN) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
-+ else
- {
-- int large_send_mss = (txdw0 >> 16) & CP_TC_LGSEN_MSS_MASK;
-+ ip->ip_sum = 0;
-+ ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(ip, hlen);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode IP header len=%d checksum=%04x\n",
-+ hlen, ip->ip_sum);
-+ }
-+ }
-
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode offloaded task TSO MTU=%d IP data %d "
-- "frame data %d specified MSS=%d\n", ETH_MTU,
-- ip_data_len, saved_size - ETH_HLEN, large_send_mss);
-+ if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_LGSEN) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
-+ {
-+ int large_send_mss = (txdw0 >> 16) & CP_TC_LGSEN_MSS_MASK;
-
-- int tcp_send_offset = 0;
-- int send_count = 0;
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode offloaded task TSO MTU=%d IP data %d "
-+ "frame data %d specified MSS=%d\n", ETH_MTU,
-+ ip_data_len, saved_size - ETH_HLEN, large_send_mss);
-
-- /* maximum IP header length is 60 bytes */
-- uint8_t saved_ip_header[60];
-+ int tcp_send_offset = 0;
-+ int send_count = 0;
-
-- /* save IP header template; data area is used in tcp checksum calculation */
-- memcpy(saved_ip_header, eth_payload_data, hlen);
-+ /* maximum IP header length is 60 bytes */
-+ uint8_t saved_ip_header[60];
-
-- /* a placeholder for checksum calculation routine in tcp case */
-- uint8_t *data_to_checksum = eth_payload_data + hlen - 12;
-- // size_t data_to_checksum_len = eth_payload_len - hlen + 12;
-+ /* save IP header template; data area is used in tcp checksum calculation */
-+ memcpy(saved_ip_header, eth_payload_data, hlen);
-
-- /* pointer to TCP header */
-- tcp_header *p_tcp_hdr = (tcp_header*)(eth_payload_data + hlen);
-+ /* a placeholder for checksum calculation routine in tcp case */
-+ uint8_t *data_to_checksum = eth_payload_data + hlen - 12;
-+ // size_t data_to_checksum_len = eth_payload_len - hlen + 12;
-
-- int tcp_hlen = TCP_HEADER_DATA_OFFSET(p_tcp_hdr);
-+ /* pointer to TCP header */
-+ tcp_header *p_tcp_hdr = (tcp_header*)(eth_payload_data + hlen);
-
-- /* ETH_MTU = ip header len + tcp header len + payload */
-- int tcp_data_len = ip_data_len - tcp_hlen;
-- int tcp_chunk_size = ETH_MTU - hlen - tcp_hlen;
-+ int tcp_hlen = TCP_HEADER_DATA_OFFSET(p_tcp_hdr);
-
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO IP data len %d TCP hlen %d TCP "
-- "data len %d TCP chunk size %d\n", ip_data_len,
-- tcp_hlen, tcp_data_len, tcp_chunk_size);
-+ /* ETH_MTU = ip header len + tcp header len + payload */
-+ int tcp_data_len = ip_data_len - tcp_hlen;
-+ int tcp_chunk_size = ETH_MTU - hlen - tcp_hlen;
-
-- /* note the cycle below overwrites IP header data,
-- but restores it from saved_ip_header before sending packet */
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO IP data len %d TCP hlen %d TCP "
-+ "data len %d TCP chunk size %d\n", ip_data_len,
-+ tcp_hlen, tcp_data_len, tcp_chunk_size);
-
-- int is_last_frame = 0;
-+ /* note the cycle below overwrites IP header data,
-+ but restores it from saved_ip_header before sending packet */
-
-- for (tcp_send_offset = 0; tcp_send_offset < tcp_data_len; tcp_send_offset += tcp_chunk_size)
-- {
-- uint16_t chunk_size = tcp_chunk_size;
--
-- /* check if this is the last frame */
-- if (tcp_send_offset + tcp_chunk_size >= tcp_data_len)
-- {
-- is_last_frame = 1;
-- chunk_size = tcp_data_len - tcp_send_offset;
-- }
--
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO TCP seqno %08x\n",
-- be32_to_cpu(p_tcp_hdr->th_seq));
--
-- /* add 4 TCP pseudoheader fields */
-- /* copy IP source and destination fields */
-- memcpy(data_to_checksum, saved_ip_header + 12, 8);
--
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO calculating TCP checksum for "
-- "packet with %d bytes data\n", tcp_hlen +
-- chunk_size);
--
-- if (tcp_send_offset)
-- {
-- memcpy((uint8_t*)p_tcp_hdr + tcp_hlen, (uint8_t*)p_tcp_hdr + tcp_hlen + tcp_send_offset, chunk_size);
-- }
--
-- /* keep PUSH and FIN flags only for the last frame */
-- if (!is_last_frame)
-- {
-- TCP_HEADER_CLEAR_FLAGS(p_tcp_hdr, TCP_FLAG_PUSH|TCP_FLAG_FIN);
-- }
--
-- /* recalculate TCP checksum */
-- ip_pseudo_header *p_tcpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_TCP;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(tcp_hlen + chunk_size);
--
-- p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = 0;
--
-- int tcp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, tcp_hlen + chunk_size + 12);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO TCP checksum %04x\n",
-- tcp_checksum);
--
-- p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = tcp_checksum;
--
-- /* restore IP header */
-- memcpy(eth_payload_data, saved_ip_header, hlen);
--
-- /* set IP data length and recalculate IP checksum */
-- ip->ip_len = cpu_to_be16(hlen + tcp_hlen + chunk_size);
--
-- /* increment IP id for subsequent frames */
-- ip->ip_id = cpu_to_be16(tcp_send_offset/tcp_chunk_size + be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_id));
--
-- ip->ip_sum = 0;
-- ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(eth_payload_data, hlen);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO IP header len=%d "
-- "checksum=%04x\n", hlen, ip->ip_sum);
--
-- int tso_send_size = ETH_HLEN + hlen + tcp_hlen + chunk_size;
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO transferring packet size "
-- "%d\n", tso_send_size);
-- rtl8139_transfer_frame(s, saved_buffer, tso_send_size,
-- 0, (uint8_t *) dot1q_buffer);
--
-- /* add transferred count to TCP sequence number */
-- p_tcp_hdr->th_seq = cpu_to_be32(chunk_size + be32_to_cpu(p_tcp_hdr->th_seq));
-- ++send_count;
-- }
-+ int is_last_frame = 0;
-
-- /* Stop sending this frame */
-- saved_size = 0;
-- }
-- else if (txdw0 & (CP_TX_TCPCS|CP_TX_UDPCS))
-+ for (tcp_send_offset = 0; tcp_send_offset < tcp_data_len; tcp_send_offset += tcp_chunk_size)
- {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode need TCP or UDP checksum\n");
-+ uint16_t chunk_size = tcp_chunk_size;
-
-- /* maximum IP header length is 60 bytes */
-- uint8_t saved_ip_header[60];
-- memcpy(saved_ip_header, eth_payload_data, hlen);
-+ /* check if this is the last frame */
-+ if (tcp_send_offset + tcp_chunk_size >= tcp_data_len)
-+ {
-+ is_last_frame = 1;
-+ chunk_size = tcp_data_len - tcp_send_offset;
-+ }
-
-- uint8_t *data_to_checksum = eth_payload_data + hlen - 12;
-- // size_t data_to_checksum_len = eth_payload_len - hlen + 12;
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO TCP seqno %08x\n",
-+ be32_to_cpu(p_tcp_hdr->th_seq));
-
- /* add 4 TCP pseudoheader fields */
- /* copy IP source and destination fields */
- memcpy(data_to_checksum, saved_ip_header + 12, 8);
-
-- if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_TCPCS) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO calculating TCP checksum for "
-+ "packet with %d bytes data\n", tcp_hlen +
-+ chunk_size);
-+
-+ if (tcp_send_offset)
- {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode calculating TCP checksum for "
-- "packet with %d bytes data\n", ip_data_len);
-+ memcpy((uint8_t*)p_tcp_hdr + tcp_hlen, (uint8_t*)p_tcp_hdr + tcp_hlen + tcp_send_offset, chunk_size);
-+ }
-
-- ip_pseudo_header *p_tcpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_TCP;
-- p_tcpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(ip_data_len);
-+ /* keep PUSH and FIN flags only for the last frame */
-+ if (!is_last_frame)
-+ {
-+ TCP_HEADER_CLEAR_FLAGS(p_tcp_hdr, TCP_FLAG_PUSH|TCP_FLAG_FIN);
-+ }
-
-- tcp_header* p_tcp_hdr = (tcp_header *) (data_to_checksum+12);
-+ /* recalculate TCP checksum */
-+ ip_pseudo_header *p_tcpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_TCP;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(tcp_hlen + chunk_size);
-
-- p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = 0;
-+ p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = 0;
-
-- int tcp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, ip_data_len + 12);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TCP checksum %04x\n",
-- tcp_checksum);
-+ int tcp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, tcp_hlen + chunk_size + 12);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO TCP checksum %04x\n",
-+ tcp_checksum);
-
-- p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = tcp_checksum;
-- }
-- else if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_UDPCS) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_UDP)
-- {
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode calculating UDP checksum for "
-- "packet with %d bytes data\n", ip_data_len);
-+ p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = tcp_checksum;
-
-- ip_pseudo_header *p_udpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-- p_udpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-- p_udpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP;
-- p_udpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(ip_data_len);
-+ /* restore IP header */
-+ memcpy(eth_payload_data, saved_ip_header, hlen);
-
-- udp_header *p_udp_hdr = (udp_header *) (data_to_checksum+12);
-+ /* set IP data length and recalculate IP checksum */
-+ ip->ip_len = cpu_to_be16(hlen + tcp_hlen + chunk_size);
-
-- p_udp_hdr->uh_sum = 0;
-+ /* increment IP id for subsequent frames */
-+ ip->ip_id = cpu_to_be16(tcp_send_offset/tcp_chunk_size + be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_id));
-
-- int udp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, ip_data_len + 12);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode UDP checksum %04x\n",
-- udp_checksum);
-+ ip->ip_sum = 0;
-+ ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(eth_payload_data, hlen);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO IP header len=%d "
-+ "checksum=%04x\n", hlen, ip->ip_sum);
-
-- p_udp_hdr->uh_sum = udp_checksum;
-- }
-+ int tso_send_size = ETH_HLEN + hlen + tcp_hlen + chunk_size;
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TSO transferring packet size "
-+ "%d\n", tso_send_size);
-+ rtl8139_transfer_frame(s, saved_buffer, tso_send_size,
-+ 0, (uint8_t *) dot1q_buffer);
-
-- /* restore IP header */
-- memcpy(eth_payload_data, saved_ip_header, hlen);
-+ /* add transferred count to TCP sequence number */
-+ p_tcp_hdr->th_seq = cpu_to_be32(chunk_size + be32_to_cpu(p_tcp_hdr->th_seq));
-+ ++send_count;
- }
-+
-+ /* Stop sending this frame */
-+ saved_size = 0;
-+ }
-+ else if (txdw0 & (CP_TX_TCPCS|CP_TX_UDPCS))
-+ {
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode need TCP or UDP checksum\n");
-+
-+ /* maximum IP header length is 60 bytes */
-+ uint8_t saved_ip_header[60];
-+ memcpy(saved_ip_header, eth_payload_data, hlen);
-+
-+ uint8_t *data_to_checksum = eth_payload_data + hlen - 12;
-+ // size_t data_to_checksum_len = eth_payload_len - hlen + 12;
-+
-+ /* add 4 TCP pseudoheader fields */
-+ /* copy IP source and destination fields */
-+ memcpy(data_to_checksum, saved_ip_header + 12, 8);
-+
-+ if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_TCPCS) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
-+ {
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode calculating TCP checksum for "
-+ "packet with %d bytes data\n", ip_data_len);
-+
-+ ip_pseudo_header *p_tcpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_TCP;
-+ p_tcpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(ip_data_len);
-+
-+ tcp_header* p_tcp_hdr = (tcp_header *) (data_to_checksum+12);
-+
-+ p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = 0;
-+
-+ int tcp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, ip_data_len + 12);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode TCP checksum %04x\n",
-+ tcp_checksum);
-+
-+ p_tcp_hdr->th_sum = tcp_checksum;
-+ }
-+ else if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_UDPCS) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_UDP)
-+ {
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode calculating UDP checksum for "
-+ "packet with %d bytes data\n", ip_data_len);
-+
-+ ip_pseudo_header *p_udpip_hdr = (ip_pseudo_header *)data_to_checksum;
-+ p_udpip_hdr->zeros = 0;
-+ p_udpip_hdr->ip_proto = IP_PROTO_UDP;
-+ p_udpip_hdr->ip_payload = cpu_to_be16(ip_data_len);
-+
-+ udp_header *p_udp_hdr = (udp_header *) (data_to_checksum+12);
-+
-+ p_udp_hdr->uh_sum = 0;
-+
-+ int udp_checksum = ip_checksum(data_to_checksum, ip_data_len + 12);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode UDP checksum %04x\n",
-+ udp_checksum);
-+
-+ p_udp_hdr->uh_sum = udp_checksum;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* restore IP header */
-+ memcpy(eth_payload_data, saved_ip_header, hlen);
- }
- }
-
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-3.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5676f4653284..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 043d28507ef7c5fdc34866f5e3b27a72bd0cd072 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:17:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/7] rtl8139: skip offload on short Ethernet/IP header
-
-Transmit offload features access Ethernet and IP headers the packet. If
-the packet is too short we must not attempt to access header fields:
-
- int proto = be16_to_cpu(*(uint16_t *)(saved_buffer + 12));
- ...
- eth_payload_data = saved_buffer + ETH_HLEN;
- ...
- ip = (ip_header*)eth_payload_data;
- if (IP_HEADER_VERSION(ip) != IP_HEADER_VERSION_4) {
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index 2f12d42..d377b6b 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2164,6 +2164,11 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- {
- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode offloaded task checksum\n");
-
-+ /* Large enough for Ethernet and IP headers? */
-+ if (saved_size < ETH_HLEN + sizeof(ip_header)) {
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+
- /* ip packet header */
- ip_header *ip = NULL;
- int hlen = 0;
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-4.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 495d8d616b26..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 5a75d242fe019d05b46ef9bc330a6892525c84a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:17:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/7] rtl8139: check IP Header Length field
-
-The IP Header Length field was only checked in the IP checksum case, but
-is used in other cases too.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index d377b6b..cd5ac05 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2200,6 +2200,10 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- }
-
- hlen = IP_HEADER_LENGTH(ip);
-+ if (hlen < sizeof(ip_header) || hlen > eth_payload_len) {
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+
- ip_protocol = ip->ip_p;
- ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
-
-@@ -2207,17 +2211,10 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- {
- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode need IP checksum\n");
-
-- if (hlen<sizeof(ip_header) || hlen>eth_payload_len) {/* min header length */
-- /* bad packet header len */
-- /* or packet too short */
-- }
-- else
-- {
-- ip->ip_sum = 0;
-- ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(ip, hlen);
-- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode IP header len=%d checksum=%04x\n",
-- hlen, ip->ip_sum);
-- }
-+ ip->ip_sum = 0;
-+ ip->ip_sum = ip_checksum(ip, hlen);
-+ DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode IP header len=%d checksum=%04x\n",
-+ hlen, ip->ip_sum);
- }
-
- if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_LGSEN) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-5.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-5.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e633ea6b2e0b..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-5.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 6c79ea275d72bc1fd88bdcf1e7d231b2c9c865de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:17:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 5/7] rtl8139: check IP Total Length field
-
-The IP Total Length field includes the IP header and data. Make sure it
-is valid and does not exceed the Ethernet payload size.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index cd5ac05..ed2b23b 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2205,7 +2205,12 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
- }
-
- ip_protocol = ip->ip_p;
-- ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len) - hlen;
-+
-+ ip_data_len = be16_to_cpu(ip->ip_len);
-+ if (ip_data_len < hlen || ip_data_len > eth_payload_len) {
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+ ip_data_len -= hlen;
-
- if (txdw0 & CP_TX_IPCS)
- {
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-6.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-6.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dd716a6d6dc7..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-6.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 30aa7be430e7c982e9163f3bcc745d3aa57b6aa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:17:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 6/7] rtl8139: skip offload on short TCP header
-
-TCP Large Segment Offload accesses the TCP header in the packet. If the
-packet is too short we must not attempt to access header fields:
-
- tcp_header *p_tcp_hdr = (tcp_header*)(eth_payload_data + hlen);
- int tcp_hlen = TCP_HEADER_DATA_OFFSET(p_tcp_hdr);
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index ed2b23b..c8f0df9 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2224,6 +2224,11 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
-
- if ((txdw0 & CP_TX_LGSEN) && ip_protocol == IP_PROTO_TCP)
- {
-+ /* Large enough for the TCP header? */
-+ if (ip_data_len < sizeof(tcp_header)) {
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+
- int large_send_mss = (txdw0 >> 16) & CP_TC_LGSEN_MSS_MASK;
-
- DPRINTF("+++ C+ mode offloaded task TSO MTU=%d IP data %d "
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-7.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-7.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c0ad7993545..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa140-qemuu-unstable-7.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 9a084807bf6ca7c16d997a236d304111894a6539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:17:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 7/7] rtl8139: check TCP Data Offset field
-
-The TCP Data Offset field contains the length of the header. Make sure
-it is valid and does not exceed the IP data length.
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
----
- hw/net/rtl8139.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/hw/net/rtl8139.c b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-index c8f0df9..2df4a51 100644
---- a/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-+++ b/hw/net/rtl8139.c
-@@ -2253,6 +2253,11 @@ static int rtl8139_cplus_transmit_one(RTL8139State *s)
-
- int tcp_hlen = TCP_HEADER_DATA_OFFSET(p_tcp_hdr);
-
-+ /* Invalid TCP data offset? */
-+ if (tcp_hlen < sizeof(tcp_header) || tcp_hlen > ip_data_len) {
-+ goto skip_offload;
-+ }
-+
- /* ETH_MTU = ip header len + tcp header len + payload */
- int tcp_data_len = ip_data_len - tcp_hlen;
- int tcp_chunk_size = ETH_MTU - hlen - tcp_hlen;
---
-2.1.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa142-4.5.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa142-4.5.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 712950f6795a..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa142-4.5.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From 07ca00703f76ad392eda5ee52cce1197cf49c30a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
-Subject: [PATCH v2.1 for-4.5] libxl: handle read-only drives with qemu-xen
-
-The current libxl code doesn't deal with read-only drives at all.
-
-Upstream QEMU and qemu-xen only support read-only cdrom drives: make
-sure to specify "readonly=on" for cdrom drives and return error in case
-the user requested a non-cdrom read-only drive.
-
-This is XSA-142, discovered by Lin Liu
-(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1257893).
-
-Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
-
-Backport to Xen 4.5 and earlier, apropos of report and review from
-Michael Young.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c | 13 +++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-index b4ce523..d74fb14 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dm.c
-@@ -797,13 +797,18 @@ static char ** libxl__build_device_model_args_new(libxl__gc *gc,
- if (disks[i].is_cdrom) {
- if (disks[i].format == LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_EMPTY)
- drive = libxl__sprintf
-- (gc, "if=ide,index=%d,media=cdrom,cache=writeback,id=ide-%i",
-- disk, dev_number);
-+ (gc, "if=ide,index=%d,readonly=%s,media=cdrom,cache=writeback,id=ide-%i",
-+ disk, disks[i].readwrite ? "off" : "on", dev_number);
- else
- drive = libxl__sprintf
-- (gc, "file=%s,if=ide,index=%d,media=cdrom,format=%s,cache=writeback,id=ide-%i",
-- disks[i].pdev_path, disk, format, dev_number);
-+ (gc, "file=%s,if=ide,index=%d,readonly=%s,media=cdrom,format=%s,cache=writeback,id=ide-%i",
-+ disks[i].pdev_path, disk, disks[i].readwrite ? "off" : "on", format, dev_number);
- } else {
-+ if (!disks[i].readwrite) {
-+ LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, "qemu-xen doesn't support read-only disk drivers");
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+
- if (disks[i].format == LIBXL_DISK_FORMAT_EMPTY) {
- LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_WARNING, "cannot support"
- " empty disk format for %s", disks[i].vdev);
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa153-libxl.patch b/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa153-libxl.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 14a50eb02ee4..000000000000
--- a/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa153-libxl.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-From 27593ec62bdad8621df910931349d964a6dbaa8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 16:18:30 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH XSA-153 v3] libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too
-
-PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
-crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
-is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
-
-Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
-target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
-the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
-that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
-stable even under memory pressure.
-
-There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
-
-The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
-
-The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
-setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
-amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
-Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
-PoD guests).
-
-This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
-guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
-mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
-fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
-probably also in stable trees.
-
-This is XSA-153.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
----
- tools/libxl/libxl.c | 2 +-
- tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl.c b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
-index d38d0c7..1366177 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl.c
-@@ -4815,7 +4815,7 @@ retry_transaction:
- }
-
- rc = xc_domain_set_pod_target(ctx->xch, domid,
-- new_target_memkb / 4, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+ (new_target_memkb + LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT) / 4, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (rc != 0) {
- LIBXL__LOG_ERRNO(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR,
- "xc_domain_set_pod_target domid=%d, memkb=%d "
-diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
-index b514377..8019f4e 100644
---- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
-+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
-@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
- xs_transaction_t t;
- char **ents;
- int i, rc;
-+ int64_t mem_target_fudge;
-
- if (info->num_vnuma_nodes && !info->num_vcpu_soft_affinity) {
- rc = set_vnuma_affinity(gc, domid, info);
-@@ -518,11 +519,17 @@ int libxl__build_post(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
- }
- }
-
-+ mem_target_fudge =
-+ (info->type == LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM &&
-+ info->max_memkb > info->target_memkb)
-+ ? LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT : 0;
-+
- ents = libxl__calloc(gc, 12 + (info->max_vcpus * 2) + 2, sizeof(char *));
- ents[0] = "memory/static-max";
- ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->max_memkb);
- ents[2] = "memory/target";
-- ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb);
-+ ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->target_memkb - info->video_memkb
-+ - mem_target_fudge);
- ents[4] = "memory/videoram";
- ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRId64, info->video_memkb);
- ents[6] = "domid";
---
-1.7.10.4
-