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authorMatthias Andree <mandree@FreeBSD.org>2012-08-30 06:24:48 +0000
committerMatthias Andree <mandree@FreeBSD.org>2012-08-30 06:24:48 +0000
commit3a45d04f929bb95d7c35e0853bbfaa469d4e872d (patch)
tree518a56b8c4cf6a4cf252d3477b1f1a40dcf02b77 /mail/fetchmail/files
parentAdd a vuln' entry for fetchmail's CVE-2011-3389 vulnerability. (diff)
Update to upstream release fetchmail 6.3.22.
Fixes CVE-2011-3389 (reenabling a countermeasure against chosen-plaintext attacks against block cipher initialization) Fixes CVE-2012-3482 (vulnerabilities in NTLM authentication; already fixed in FreeBSD's port 6.3.21_1) Assorted other fixes and workarounds. Adds a Swedish translation. Release Notes: http://developer.berlios.de/project/shownotes.php?release_id=19117 PR: 171177 Approved by: Corey Halpin (maintainer) Security: CVE-2012-3482 Security: http://www.vuxml.org/freebsd/83f9e943-e664-11e1-a66d-080027ef73ec.html Security: CVE-2011-3389 Security: http://www.vuxml.org/freebsd/18ce9a90-f269-11e1-be53-080027ef73ec.html
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=303362
Diffstat (limited to 'mail/fetchmail/files')
-rw-r--r--mail/fetchmail/files/patch-CVE-2012-348253
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/mail/fetchmail/files/patch-CVE-2012-3482 b/mail/fetchmail/files/patch-CVE-2012-3482
deleted file mode 100644
index 64e4588effe1..000000000000
--- a/mail/fetchmail/files/patch-CVE-2012-3482
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ntlm.h b/ntlm.h
-index 1469633..ad83520 100644
---- a/ntlm.h
-+++ b/ntlm.h
-@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ uint32 msgType;
- tSmbStrHeader uDomain;
- uint32 flags;
- uint8 challengeData[8];
--uint8 reserved[8];
--tSmbStrHeader emptyString;
-+uint32 context[2];
-+tSmbStrHeader targetInfo;
- uint8 buffer[1024];
- uint32 bufIndex;
- }tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge;
-diff --git a/ntlmsubr.c b/ntlmsubr.c
-index f9d2733..63cbed8 100644
---- a/ntlmsubr.c
-+++ b/ntlmsubr.c
-@@ -55,7 +55,32 @@ int ntlm_helper(int sock, struct query *ctl, const char *proto)
- if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
- goto cancelfail;
-
-- (void)from64tobits (&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(challenge));
-+ if ((result = from64tobits (&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(challenge))) < 0
-+ || result < ((void *)&challenge.context - (void *)&challenge))
-+ {
-+ report (stderr, GT_("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
-+ /* We do not goto cancelfail; the server has already sent the
-+ * tagged reply, so the protocol exchange has ended, no need
-+ * for us to send the asterisk. */
-+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* validate challenge:
-+ * - ident
-+ * - message type
-+ * - that offset points into buffer
-+ * - that offset + length does not wrap
-+ * - that offset + length is not bigger than buffer */
-+ if (0 != memcmp("NTLMSSP", challenge.ident, 8)
-+ || challenge.msgType != 2
-+ || challenge.uDomain.offset > result
-+ || challenge.uDomain.offset + challenge.uDomain.len < challenge.uDomain.offset
-+ || challenge.uDomain.offset + challenge.uDomain.len > result)
-+ {
-+ report (stderr, GT_("NTLM challenge contains invalid data.\n"));
-+ result = PS_AUTHFAIL;
-+ goto cancelfail;
-+ }
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);