From c9b41dd6a7352094cfcf453407b82addaa0f26dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jun Kuriyama Date: Thu, 8 Oct 1998 14:49:28 +0000 Subject: I've checked and make changes from submittion as following patch. (1) PKGNAME satisfies handbook rule. (2) @dirrm lib/radius fails when lib/radius/acct exists. Submitted by: Stefan Esser ----- diff -urN -x CVS merit/Makefile radius/Makefile --- merit/Makefile Fri Sep 18 02:00:05 1998 +++ radius/Makefile Wed Oct 7 23:54:43 1998 @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ # DISTNAME= radius.3.6B.basic -PKGNAME= radius-3.6B.basic +PKGNAME= radius-basic-3.6B CATEGORIES= net MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.merit.edu/radius/releases/ diff -urN -x CVS merit/pkg/PLIST radius/pkg/PLIST --- merit/pkg/PLIST Fri Sep 18 01:58:28 1998 +++ radius/pkg/PLIST Wed Oct 7 23:51:47 1998 @@ -12,4 +12,5 @@ lib/radius/db/engine.config.sample lib/radius/db/vendors.sample @dirrm lib/radius/db +@dirrm lib/radius/acct @dirrm lib/radius ----- --- net/radius/files/patch-ad | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/radius/files/patch-ad') diff --git a/net/radius/files/patch-ad b/net/radius/files/patch-ad index 2517a6195c78..d6fe8e6628e9 100644 --- a/net/radius/files/patch-ad +++ b/net/radius/files/patch-ad @@ -1,28 +1,23 @@ ---- src/rad.kerberos.c.orig Wed Sep 18 17:34:21 1996 -+++ src/rad.kerberos.c Tue Aug 26 12:57:28 1997 -@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ - extern int mit_passwd_to_key (); - extern int afs_passwd_to_key (); +--- src/rad.kerberos.c~ Fri Jun 26 00:40:50 1998 ++++ src/rad.kerberos.c Thu Sep 17 18:50:28 1998 +@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ --static int krb_pass PROTO((AUTH_REQ *, int, char *)); -+static int krb_pass (AUTH_REQ *, int, char *); + #include - #if defined(A_KERB) - static AATV akrb_aatv = -@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ - #if defined(M_KERB) - if (strcmp (authreq->direct_aatv->id, "MKERB") == 0) - { -- krbval = krb_get_in_tkt (userid, "", realm, "krbtgt", realm, -+ krbval = krb_get_in_tkt (userid, KRB_INSTANCE, realm, "krbtgt", -+ realm, - DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, mit_passwd_to_key, - NULL, passwd); - } -@@ -192,6 +193,12 @@ - } - #endif /* A_KERB */ +-static int krb_pass PROTO((AUTH_REQ *, int, char *, +- int (*) (AUTH_REQ *, int, char *))); ++static int krb_pass (AUTH_REQ *, int, char *, ++ int (*) (AUTH_REQ *, int, char *)); + + extern int debug_flag; + +@@ -225,8 +225,14 @@ + krbval = INTK_BADPW; /* Fail if type is bad somehow */ + /* get the ticket */ +- krbval = krb_get_in_tkt (userid, "", realm, "krbtgt", realm, ++ krbval = krb_get_in_tkt (userid, KRB_INSTANCE, realm, "krbtgt", realm, + DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, passwd_to_key, NULL, passwd); + /* + * XXX + * This can be spoofed fairly easily... Should attempt to authenticate @@ -32,8 +27,8 @@ switch (krbval) { case INTK_OK: -@@ -207,6 +214,37 @@ - func, krbval); +@@ -294,6 +300,37 @@ + krbval, userid, realm); break; } +#ifdef M_KERB -- cgit v1.2.3