1 files changed, 34 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/x11-servers/xorg-server/files/patch-CVE-2014-8092-4-4 b/x11-servers/xorg-server/files/patch-CVE-2014-8092-4-4
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..64436ed41424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11-servers/xorg-server/files/patch-CVE-2014-8092-4-4
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From e0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 23:44:46 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH 04/40] dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE()
+ [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
+
+Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients
+in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during
+checks.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ include/dix.h | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h
+index 991a3ce..e0c6ed8 100644
+--- include/dix.h
++++ include/dix.h
+@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ 
+ #define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
+     if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
+-        (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
++        ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
++        ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len))  \
+          return(BadLength)
+ 
+ #define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\
+-- 
+2.1.2
+