diff options
| author | Guido Falsi <madpilot@FreeBSD.org> | 2016-04-15 15:12:45 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Guido Falsi <madpilot@FreeBSD.org> | 2016-04-15 15:12:45 +0000 |
| commit | 2272af58cb7e22d99daa13a86fde60e7e4b16bb2 (patch) | |
| tree | ca3a5a8d8074cfdb18723e0f4b3be6568d14fe91 /security | |
| parent | Support the various forms of Kerberos via options. (diff) | |
Document Asterisk and PJsip vulnerabilities.
Notes
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=413349
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/vuxml/vuln.xml | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml index 060cb6f62f7b..c771b53e25dd 100644 --- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml +++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml @@ -58,6 +58,83 @@ Notes: * Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.) --> <vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1"> + <vuln vid="e21474c6-031a-11e6-aa86-001999f8d30b"> + <topic>PJSIP -- TCP denial of service in PJProject</topic> + <affects> + <package> + <name>pjsip</name> + <range><le>2.4.5</le></range> + </package> + <package> + <name>pjsip-extsrtp</name> + <range><le>2.4.5</le></range> + </package> + </affects> + <description> + <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <p>The Asterisk project reports:</p> + <blockquote cite="http://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories"> + <p>PJProject has a limit on the number of TCP connections + that it can accept. Furthermore, PJProject does not close + TCP connections it accepts. By default, this value is + approximately 60.</p> + <p>An attacker can deplete the number of allowed TCP + connections by opening TCP connections and sending no + data to Asterisk.</p> + <p>If PJProject has been compiled in debug mode, then + once the number of allowed TCP connections has been + depleted, the next attempted TCP connection to Asterisk + will crash due to an assertion in PJProject.</p> + <p>If PJProject has not been compiled in debug mode, then + any further TCP connection attempts will be rejected. + This makes Asterisk unable to process TCP SIP traffic.</p> + <p>Note that this only affects TCP/TLS, since UDP is + connectionless.</p> + </blockquote> + </body> + </description> + <references> + <url>http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-005.html</url> + </references> + <dates> + <discovery>2016-02-15</discovery> + <entry>2016-04-15</entry> + </dates> + </vuln> + + <vuln vid="ee50726e-0319-11e6-aa86-001999f8d30b"> + <topic>asterisk -- Long Contact URIs in REGISTER requests can crash Asterisk</topic> + <affects> + <package> + <name>asterisk13</name> + <range><lt>13.8.1</lt></range> + </package> + </affects> + <description> + <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <p>The Asterisk project reports:</p> + <blockquote cite="http://www.asterisk.org/downloads/security-advisories"> + <p>Asterisk may crash when processing an incoming REGISTER + request if that REGISTER contains a Contact header with + a lengthy URI.</p> + <p>This crash will only happen for requests that pass + authentication. Unauthenticated REGISTER requests will + not result in a crash occurring.</p> + <p>This vulnerability only affects Asterisk when using + PJSIP as its SIP stack. The chan_sip module does not have + this problem.</p> + </blockquote> + </body> + </description> + <references> + <url>http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-004.html</url> + </references> + <dates> + <discovery>2016-01-19</discovery> + <entry>2016-04-15</entry> + </dates> + </vuln> + <vuln vid="f2217cdf-01e4-11e6-b1ce-002590263bf5"> <topic>go -- remote denial of service</topic> <affects> |