diff options
| author | Cy Schubert <cy@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-10-23 22:30:39 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Cy Schubert <cy@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-10-23 22:30:39 +0000 |
| commit | cf7aca2a640870ef87ebb339555a3aa42fbe5077 (patch) | |
| tree | 5eda8c9cbcdf7e5a8d3634ae96db4a77f3f1b990 /security/krb5/files/patch-kadmin::v4server::kadm_ser_wrap.c | |
| parent | Add more sites to MASTER_SITE_RUBY. Thanks a lot! (diff) | |
Fix buffer overflow in kadmind4 (remote user can gain root access to
KDC host).
Obtained from: Tom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu> on kerberos-announce mailing list,
MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2002-002
Notes
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=68693
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/krb5/files/patch-kadmin::v4server::kadm_ser_wrap.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/krb5/files/patch-kadmin::v4server::kadm_ser_wrap.c b/security/krb5/files/patch-kadmin::v4server::kadm_ser_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2fa89e96690b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/krb5/files/patch-kadmin::v4server::kadm_ser_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +--- kadmin/v4server/kadm_ser_wrap.c.orig Tue May 23 14:44:50 2000 ++++ kadmin/v4server/kadm_ser_wrap.c Wed Oct 23 15:15:24 2002 +@@ -170,14 +170,21 @@ + u_char *retdat, *tmpdat; + int retval, retlen; + +- if (strncmp(KADM_VERSTR, (char *)*dat, KADM_VERSIZE)) { ++ if ((*dat_len < KADM_VERSIZE + sizeof(krb5_ui_4)) ++ || strncmp(KADM_VERSTR, (char *)*dat, KADM_VERSIZE)) { + errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_BAD_VER); + return KADM_BAD_VER; + } + in_len = KADM_VERSIZE; + /* get the length */ +- if ((retc = stv_long(*dat, &r_len, in_len, *dat_len)) < 0) ++ if ((retc = stv_long(*dat, &r_len, in_len, *dat_len)) < 0 ++ || (r_len > *dat_len - KADM_VERSIZE - sizeof(krb5_ui_4)) ++ || (*dat_len - r_len - KADM_VERSIZE - ++ sizeof(krb5_ui_4) > sizeof(authent.dat))) { ++ errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_LENGTH_ERROR); + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; ++ } ++ + in_len += retc; + authent.length = *dat_len - r_len - KADM_VERSIZE - sizeof(krb5_ui_4); + memcpy((char *)authent.dat, (char *)(*dat) + in_len, authent.length); |