Add TrustedBSD MAC(4) support to ntpd.

These changes add support for running ntpd as non-root, and improve support
for the --jaildir (chroot) option when running on freebsd. These correspond
to the changes made in the base system with r336525.

The new patches in this change are exactly what was submitted upstream in
https://bugs.ntp.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3509

Approved by:	cy@
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16396

3 files changed, 80 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/net/ntp/Makefile b/net/ntp/Makefile
index 9937311e9d46..e22f7f841ce5 100644
--- a/net/ntp/Makefile
+++ b/net/ntp/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	ntp
 PORTVERSION=	4.2.8p11
-PORTREVISION=	1
+PORTREVISION=	2
 CATEGORIES=	net ipv6
 MASTER_SITES=	http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp/ntp_spool/ntp4/ntp-4.2/ \
 		http://archive.ntp.org/ntp4/ntp-4.2/ \
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@ CONFLICTS=	ntp-devel-* openntpd-*
 
 USES=		cpe pathfix shebangfix libedit libtool localbase:ldflags \
 		pkgconfig
+USES+=		autoreconf # until trustedbsd-mac changes accepted upstream
 
 GNU_CONFIGURE=	yes
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=	--enable-leap-smear
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=	--enable-leap-smear --enable-trustedbsd-mac
 
 TEST_TARGET=	check
 
diff --git a/net/ntp/files/patch-ntpd_ntpd.c b/net/ntp/files/patch-ntpd_ntpd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4e0f18e7f056
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ntp/files/patch-ntpd_ntpd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+--- ntpd/ntpd.c.orig	2018-02-27 15:15:48 UTC
++++ ntpd/ntpd.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@
+ #if defined(HAVE_PRIV_H) && defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_PRIVS)
+ # include <priv.h>
+ #endif /* HAVE_PRIV_H */
++#if defined(HAVE_TRUSTEDBSD_MAC)
++# include <sys/mac.h>
++#endif /* HAVE_TRUSTEDBSD_MAC */
+ #endif /* HAVE_DROPROOT */
+ 
+ #if defined (LIBSECCOMP) && (KERN_SECCOMP)
+@@ -634,7 +637,12 @@ ntpdmain(
+ 	/* MPE lacks the concept of root */
+ # if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && !defined(MPE)
+ 	uid = getuid();
+-	if (uid && !HAVE_OPT( SAVECONFIGQUIT )) {
++	if (uid && !HAVE_OPT( SAVECONFIGQUIT )
++#  if defined(HAVE_TRUSTEDBSD_MAC)
++	    /* We can run as non-root if the mac_ntpd policy is enabled. */
++	    && mac_is_present("ntpd") != 1
++#  endif
++	    ) {
+ 		msyslog_term = TRUE;
+ 		msyslog(LOG_ERR,
+ 			"must be run as root, not uid %ld", (long)uid);
+@@ -1082,7 +1090,17 @@ getgroup:
+ 			exit (-1);
+ 		}
+ 
+-#  if !defined(HAVE_LINUX_CAPABILITIES) && !defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_PRIVS)
++#  if defined(HAVE_TRUSTEDBSD_MAC)
++		/*
++		 * To manipulate system time and (re-)bind to NTP_PORT as needed
++		 * following interface changes, we must either run as uid 0 or
++		 * the mac_ntpd policy module must be enabled.
++		 */
++		if (sw_uid != 0 && mac_is_present("ntpd") != 1) {
++			msyslog(LOG_ERR, "Need MAC 'ntpd' policy enabled to drop root privileges");
++			exit (-1);
++		}
++#  elif !defined(HAVE_LINUX_CAPABILITIES) && !defined(HAVE_SOLARIS_PRIVS)
+ 		/*
+ 		 * for now assume that the privilege to bind to privileged ports
+ 		 * is associated with running with uid 0 - should be refined on
diff --git a/net/ntp/files/patch-sntp_m4_ntp__libntp.m4 b/net/ntp/files/patch-sntp_m4_ntp__libntp.m4
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b55e70993583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ntp/files/patch-sntp_m4_ntp__libntp.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+--- sntp/m4/ntp_libntp.m4.orig	2017-02-01 09:47:13 UTC
++++ sntp/m4/ntp_libntp.m4
+@@ -693,7 +693,28 @@ esac
+ 
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([$ntp_have_solarisprivs])
+ 
+-case "$ntp_use_dev_clockctl$ntp_have_linuxcaps$ntp_have_solarisprivs" in
++AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mac.h])
++
++AC_ARG_ENABLE(
++    [trustedbsd_mac],
++    [AS_HELP_STRING(
++	[--enable-trustedbsd-mac],
++	[- Use TrustedBSD MAC policy for non-root clock control]
++    )],
++    [ntp_use_trustedbsd_mac=$enableval]
++)
++
++AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we should use TrustedBSD MAC privileges])
++
++case "$ntp_use_trustedbsd_mac$ac_cv_header_sys_mac_h" in
++ yesyes)
++    AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TRUSTEDBSD_MAC], [1],
++	[Are TrustedBSD MAC policy privileges available?])
++esac
++
++AC_MSG_RESULT([$ntp_use_trustedbsd_mac])
++
++case "$ntp_use_dev_clockctl$ntp_have_linuxcaps$ntp_have_solarisprivs$ntp_use_trustedbsd_mac" in
+  *yes*)
+     AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DROPROOT], [1],
+ 	[Can we drop root privileges?])