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authorWen Heping <wen@FreeBSD.org>2011-03-07 06:57:38 +0000
committerWen Heping <wen@FreeBSD.org>2011-03-07 06:57:38 +0000
commitcd7a0077eebf3a66bdbac0e88341c8424d6cee4c (patch)
treeb621cc9c642457de61319c28c42f5f65f33df411 /lang/python26
parentMark the previous mbone/ ports (minus 2) as: (diff)
- Apply two patch from svn.python.org to fix CVE-2010-3493 and SA43463
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3493 http://secunia.com/advisories/43463
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=270407
Diffstat (limited to 'lang/python26')
-rw-r--r--lang/python26/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--lang/python26/files/patch-CVE-2010-349341
-rw-r--r--lang/python26/files/patch-SA4346389
3 files changed, 131 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lang/python26/Makefile b/lang/python26/Makefile
index 09a54b9f9e8c..f3bd63f4d4a3 100644
--- a/lang/python26/Makefile
+++ b/lang/python26/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
PORTNAME= python26
PORTVERSION= 2.6.6
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= lang python ipv6
MASTER_SITES= ${PYTHON_MASTER_SITES}
MASTER_SITE_SUBDIR= ${PYTHON_MASTER_SITE_SUBDIR}
diff --git a/lang/python26/files/patch-CVE-2010-3493 b/lang/python26/files/patch-CVE-2010-3493
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b8553d99339e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python26/files/patch-CVE-2010-3493
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+--- Lib/smtpd.py.orig 2011-03-05 13:51:22.000000000 +0000
++++ Lib/smtpd.py 2011-03-05 13:52:42.000000000 +0000
+@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@
+ self.__rcpttos = []
+ self.__data = ''
+ self.__fqdn = socket.getfqdn()
+- self.__peer = conn.getpeername()
++ try:
++ self.__peer = conn.getpeername()
++ except socket.error as err:
++ # a race condition may occur if the other end is closing
++ # before we can get the peername
++ self.close()
++ if err.args[0] != errno.ENOTCONN:
++ raise
++ return
+ print >> DEBUGSTREAM, 'Peer:', repr(self.__peer)
+ self.push('220 %s %s' % (self.__fqdn, __version__))
+ self.set_terminator('\r\n')
+@@ -291,7 +299,20 @@
+ localaddr, remoteaddr)
+
+ def handle_accept(self):
+- conn, addr = self.accept()
++ try:
++ conn, addr = self.accept()
++ except TypeError:
++ # sometimes accept() might return None
++ return
++ except socket.error as err:
++ # ECONNABORTED might be thrown
++ if err.args[0] != errno.ECONNABORTED:
++ raise
++ return
++ else:
++ # sometimes addr == None instead of (ip, port)
++ if addr == None:
++ return
+ print >> DEBUGSTREAM, 'Incoming connection from %s' % repr(addr)
+ channel = SMTPChannel(self, conn, addr)
+
diff --git a/lang/python26/files/patch-SA43463 b/lang/python26/files/patch-SA43463
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fe710c908456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lang/python26/files/patch-SA43463
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+--- Lib/CGIHTTPServer.py.orig 2009-11-11 17:24:53.000000000 +0000
++++ Lib/CGIHTTPServer.py 2011-03-01 12:05:50.000000000 +0000
+@@ -70,27 +70,20 @@
+ return SimpleHTTPServer.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler.send_head(self)
+
+ def is_cgi(self):
+- """Test whether self.path corresponds to a CGI script,
+- and return a boolean.
++ """Test whether self.path corresponds to a CGI script.
+
+- This function sets self.cgi_info to a tuple (dir, rest)
+- when it returns True, where dir is the directory part before
+- the CGI script name. Note that rest begins with a
+- slash if it is not empty.
+-
+- The default implementation tests whether the path
+- begins with one of the strings in the list
+- self.cgi_directories (and the next character is a '/'
+- or the end of the string).
++ Returns True and updates the cgi_info attribute to the tuple
++ (dir, rest) if self.path requires running a CGI script.
++ Returns False otherwise.
++
++ The default implementation tests whether the normalized url
++ path begins with one of the strings in self.cgi_directories
++ (and the next character is a '/' or the end of the string).
+ """
+-
+- path = self.path
+-
+- for x in self.cgi_directories:
+- i = len(x)
+- if path[:i] == x and (not path[i:] or path[i] == '/'):
+- self.cgi_info = path[:i], path[i+1:]
+- return True
++ splitpath = _url_collapse_path_split(self.path)
++ if splitpath[0] in self.cgi_directories:
++ self.cgi_info = splitpath
++ return True
+ return False
+
+ cgi_directories = ['/cgi-bin', '/htbin']
+@@ -299,6 +292,46 @@
+ self.log_message("CGI script exited OK")
+
+
++# TODO(gregory.p.smith): Move this into an appropriate library.
++def _url_collapse_path_split(path):
++ """
++ Given a URL path, remove extra '/'s and '.' path elements and collapse
++ any '..' references.
++
++ Implements something akin to RFC-2396 5.2 step 6 to parse relative paths.
++
++ Returns: A tuple of (head, tail) where tail is everything after the final /
++ and head is everything before it. Head will always start with a '/' and,
++ if it contains anything else, never have a trailing '/'.
++
++ Raises: IndexError if too many '..' occur within the path.
++ """
++ # Similar to os.path.split(os.path.normpath(path)) but specific to URL
++ # path semantics rather than local operating system semantics.
++ path_parts = []
++ for part in path.split('/'):
++ if part == '.':
++ path_parts.append('')
++ else:
++ path_parts.append(part)
++ # Filter out blank non trailing parts before consuming the '..'.
++ path_parts = [part for part in path_parts[:-1] if part] + path_parts[-1:]
++ if path_parts:
++ tail_part = path_parts.pop()
++ else:
++ tail_part = ''
++ head_parts = []
++ for part in path_parts:
++ if part == '..':
++ head_parts.pop()
++ else:
++ head_parts.append(part)
++ if tail_part and tail_part == '..':
++ head_parts.pop()
++ tail_part = ''
++ return ('/' + '/'.join(head_parts), tail_part)
++
++
+ nobody = None
+
+ def nobody_uid():